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2                                                 Abstract
    We assess the role of financial reforms and liberalization in Korea’s financial crisis,
which erupted in late 1997. We first examine financial reforms carried out since the
early 1980s and their effects on corporate financing as well as the current account.
We then analyze policy issues associated with the current financial crisis. Our main
conclusion is that the crisis is due in no small measure to the unbalanced nature of
Korea’s financial reforms – extensive external liberalization combined with
inadequate internal liberalization. Therefore, the key to Korea’s recovery lies in
successful restructuring of its financial institutions.
31.Introduction
   An active industrial policy has been a prominent feature of the rapid economic
growth Korea has achieved since the early 1960s. The Korean government has played
a significant role in the allocation of resources within the economy. In particular, the
government played an instrumental role in the promotion of heavy and chemical
industries in the 1970s, when Korea moved away from an almost exclusive reliance
on light industries toward a more diversified industrial structure. A by-product of the
pervasive industrial policy has been the emergence and expansion of chaebol  r large
conglomerates which have come to dominate the Korean economy.
   The key component of Korea’s industrial policy has been the direction of credit
toward favored sectors and firms although subsidies, tax concessions and protectionist
barriers were also integral elements. The government extended loans at preferential
rates to those sectors and firms. Such extensive interference has hampered the
development of an efficient and competitive banking system. Due to the implicit
guarantees of the government, lending banks had little incentive to undertake serious
credit evaluation or ex-post monitoring. At the same time, the availability of
artificially inexpensive credit did little to encourage firms to properly evaluate the
profitability of their investment projects. The predictable result was a gradual
deterioration in the efficiency of investment and weakening of the banking system.
   The rapid economic growth meant that the economy reached a stage, in terms of
both size and complexity, in which government initiative became clearly less efficient
than the market mechanism as the tool for managing the economy. In recognition of
this, the government implemented a broad range of structural reforms in the corporate
sector since the early 1980s. To complement these corporate sector reforms, the
government also undertook some preliminary reforms in the financial sector.
4   These incipient financial reforms gathered momentum in the 1990s. The reforms
implemented in this period include interest rate deregulation, granting of greater
managerial autonomy to financial institutions, the easing of restrictions on business
activities of existing financial firms as well as entry into the financial industry, foreign
exchange liberalization, capital market opening and other measures. The pace of the
reforms were accelerated even further in connection with Korea’s entry into the
OECD in 1996, since financial liberalization was a major pre-condition for entry.
   The financial reforms had noticeable impacts on both corporate financing and the
current account. In the area of corporate financing, the remarkable growth of direct
financing was the most notable consequence. In spite of this growth, however, the
share of debt financing in total external financing remained high because the growth
of corporate bonds and commercial paper far outpaced the growth of the stock market.
With respect to the current account, it appears that the primary effect of the reforms
has been to worsen the current account by inducing greater capital inflows, which lead
to an appreciation of the currency and an increase in consumption.
   In late 1997, a financial crisis of unprecedented proportions struck the Korean
economy, forcing the government to turn to the IMF for assistance. The financial
crisis has led to a deep recession in the real sector, with real GDP expected to shrink
by 5-6% in 1998 and unemployment projected to reach around 7% by the end of
1998. Korea is currently in the midst of a painful process of structural adjustment.
   A major cause of the crisis has been the unbalanced nature of the financial reforms.
That is, the policy mix of inadequate domestic financial liberalization and rapid
external financial liberalization inevitably meant that the domestic financial system
could not efficiently allocate the large inflows of foreign capital. Consequently, a
large portion of the inflows was invested in risky projects, contributing to the growth
5of non-performing loans and more generally, weakening of the financial system. In
terms of overcoming the current financial crisis, the top policy priority is to re-
structure the debilitated financial system into a sound one.
2.Financial Reforms since the 1980s
2.1 Financial Liberalization and Internationalization in the 1980s
   Korea achieved remarkable economic growth during the 1960s and the 1970s under
a series of economic development plans implemented by the government. As the
economy matured, however, the central role of the government in economic
management began to adversely affect the overall efficiency of the economy.
Consequently, the government initiated a wide range of structural adjustments in the
real sector with a view to expanding the role of market forces. To complement those
changes in the real sector, the government also undertook a number of preliminary
measures to liberalize and internationalize the financial sector.
   In a major step to loosen government control over the financial sector, the
government returned the ownership of all nationwide commercial banks to the private
sector by 1983. The government abolished or greatly simplified a large number of
regulations governing the internal management and operations of commercial banks.
Another major reform was the replacement of direct credit controls with a more
indirect system of control based on orthodox monetary policy instruments in 1982.
   As a further measure to create a more competitive banking environment, the
government encouraged the establishment of new banks by lowering regulatory entry
barriers. Two new nationwide commercial banks, namely Shi han Bank and Boram
Bank, came into existence in 1982 and 1983, respectively. They were joined by three
other new commercial banks – Donghwa, Dongnam and Daedong – in 1989. The
1987 – 1989 period also witnessed the establishment of five securities investment
6trust houses and nine domestic life insurance companies. The overall result was a
notable upsurge in the number of banks as well as non-bank financial institutions and
greater competition in the financial industry.
   A related development was the relaxation of restrictions on business activities by
financial institutions. This enabled commercial banks to expand into a wide range of
new fields, including sales of commercial bills, credit cards, sales of government
bonds under repurchase agreements (RPs), factoring, mutual installment savings,
trusts, negotiable certificates of deposits (CDs), as well as the acceptance, discount
and sale of trade bills. Among non-financial institutions, investment and finance
companies and merchant banking corporations were permitted to offer commercial
paper (CP) and cash management accounts (CMAs). At the same time, securities
companies were allowed to guarantee corporate bonds, in rmediate CDs, and offer
bond management funds (BMFs).
   There were also a number of measures aimed at deregulating interest rates during
the 1980s. These included the abolition of preferential rates for policy loans, allowing
banks greater discretion in setting loan rates, and freeing up the issue rates on some
financial instruments. Most notably, in 1988, controls on most lending rates of both
banks and financial institutions were lifted, along with restrictions on deposit rates on
deposits of at least two years’ maturity. This bold experiment in interest rate
liberalization, however, ended abruptly due to a deteriorating economic environment.
   Another key component of financial liberalization was the internationalization of
financial markets. The total number of foreign bank branches in Korea rose from 18
in 1980 the beginning of the decade to 1989. Both open-end funds and closed-end
funds such as the Korea Fund were set up for foreign investors. Foreign securities
firms were allowed to establish representative offices and take limited equity stakes in
7domestic securities companies. The Korean life insurance market was opened to
foreign life insurance companies in 1987.
2.2 Financial Reforms in the 1990s
   As stated earlier, the main impetus for financial reforms came from the growing size
and complexity of the Korean economy, along with a concomitant realization that
continued heavy-handed government intervention in the economy was neither feasible
nor desirable. Unfortunately, the reforms have been less than effective because they
were implemented in an ad hoc fashion. This lack of a clear overall strategy went
hand in hand with a less than absolute political commitment to financial reform.
   Drawing on the lessons of the 1980s, the Korean government began to take a more
active approach to reform in the early 1990s. In particular, in July 1993 it unveiled a
financial reform program for 1993 – 1997. This was a comprehensive and consistent
plan designed to promote the efficiency and internationalization of the financial
market. The reforms undertaken in the 1990s are far-reaching in their scope. They
include full interest rate deregulation, the granting of greater managerial autonomy to
financial institutions, the easing of restrictions on new entry and business activities,
foreign exchange liberalization, capital market opening and opening up the financial
industries to foreign participation.
   The cornerstone of the reform program was a 4-stage plan for interest rate
deregulation, initiated in 1991. In the first stage, most of the short-term lending rates
of banks and non-bank financial institutions were deregulated, while deposit rate
liberalization only applied to deposits with maturity of at least three years. The second
stage covered all lending rates of banks and non-bank financial institutions excluding
loans financed by the government or the Bank of Korea’s rediscounts, as well as
deposit rates on deposits with maturity of at least two years. In the third stage, deposit
8rates on deposits with maturity of at least one year and rates on loans refinanced by
the Bank of Korea were freed up. By July 1997, all four stages had been implemented
according to schedule. Now, all lending rates and most deposit rates are determined
more or less freely by the market players.
   Regulations on entry barriers and business activities have steadily been relaxed.
Peace Bank was established as a nationwide commercial bank in 1992. Provincial
investment and finance companies were allowed to transform themselves into
merchant banking corporations in 1994. A big specialized bank – the Citizens
National Bank – was allowed to become a nationwide commercial bank in 1995.
Furthermore, the legal and institutional framework has turned more favorable toward
merger activity among market players.
   With respect to the managerial autonomy of financial institutions, they are now free
to select their chief executive officers, increase their capital, set dividends and
establish new branches in line with their business judgment. The phasing out of policy
loans to specific sectors such as export industries and small and medium enterprises
helped further strengthen managerial autonomy. Moreover, rules governing the share
of chaebols or Korean conglomerates in a bank’s total loans have been streamlined.
   A major step forward in foreign exchange liberalization was the introduction of the
Market-Average Foreign Exchange Rate (MAR) System in March 1990. Under the
system, the basic exchange rate of the Korean won against the U.S. dollar was
determined by the w ighted average of the interbank exchange rates applied in
interbank spot transactions of the previous day. The main effect of the system was to
remove the arbitrary influence of the government in the determination of foreign
exchange rates. In another key development, a completely revised Foreign Exchange
Management Act was passed in December 1991. The basis for regulation was
9changed from a positive list to a negative list. Under a negative list, all transactions
are permitted except those explicitly prohibited by legislation. In December 1994, the
government reduced the negative list and laid out a detailed schedule for deregulation
of current account transactions and liberalization of the capital account.
   The 1990s witnessed an acceleration of capital market openings. Branches of
foreign securities companies and joint-venture securities companies were allowed
from 1991 while international investment company funds were given greater access.
Major Korean companies were permitted to undertake more issues of convertible
bonds and similar securities overseas. In September 1991, non-residents who had
exchanged convertible bonds into stocks were permitted to sell them and to purchase
the proceeds from other stocks listed on the Korea Stock Exchange. Above all, the
stock market opening has gotten into high gear. Foreign investors were allowed invest
directly into stocks in 1992, subject to a firm-specific ceiling. The ceiling has been
raised to 55% of a firm’s outstanding shares by the end of 1997, and is to be abolished
by the end of 1998 in accordance with the IMF program. In addition, the opening of
the bond market was accelerated in December 1997 as part of the same program.
   Foreign participation in Korea’s financial industries, which got under way in the late
1970s and 1980s, continued to grow rapidly during the 1990s. In particular, the
government actively encouraged foreign banks to enter the domestic market. As of
March 1998, there were 68 foreign bank branches and 23 representative offices in
Korea. The government initially viewed foreign banks as a source of foreign capital.
In more recent years, the relative importance of foreign banks as a source of foreign
capital has declined but they are increasingly viewed as innovators who would impart
advanced banking techniques to their Korean competitors. Prior to 1990, the treatment
of foreign bank branches encompassed both regulatory advantages and discriminatory
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restrictions. During the 1990s, both were steadily reduced so that foreign bank
branches are granted national treatment de facto as well as de jure so that they can
now compete with domestic banks on an equal footing.
2.3 Post-OECD Financial Liberalization and Internationalization
   In connection with Korea’s entry into the OECD in 1996, the pace of financial
reforms was speeded up from its original timetable. Financial liberalization was the
main pre-condition of quid pro quo for Korea’s joining the rich countries’ club. The
agreement between the Korean government and the OECD on Korea’s accession
stipulated that remaining capital controls be progressively abolished over a 5-year
period subject to macroeconomic stability. The main elements of the post-OECD
liberalization and internationalization program are as follows:
(i) The ceiling on individual foreign portfolio equity investments was to be
raised to 10% by 2000, but it was already raised to 50% in December 12th,
1997.
(ii) Foreigners were allowed to purchase long-term non-guaranteed bonds issued
by SMEs and long-term non-guaranteed domestic CBs issued by large firms
in June 1997. Foreigners were allowed to buy long-term non-guaranteed
bonds issued by large firms from January 1998. The ceiling on foreign
holdings of most bonds was completely abolished from December 30th,
1997.
(iii) Private firms involved in major infrastructure projects were allowed to
borrow overseas in January 1997. Overseas borrowing of private companies
was liberalized for borrowings with a maturity of more than three years in
December 16th, 1997.
(iv) Borrowing related to foreign direct investment (FDI) was liberalized in
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January 1997.
(v) The issuance of domestic capital market securities in foreign markets was
allowed for financing major infrastructure projects in January 1997. The
eligibility criteria for domestic firms wishing to issue domestic capital
market securities abroad was changed from a positive list to a negative list in
April 1997.
(vi) The permitted deferment period for import payments was extended to 280
days from December 12th, 997. The limit for export advances of Korean
firms was temporarily abolished from December 1997 to December 1998.
(vii) Friendly M & As by foreigners were allowed in January 1997.
(viii) The self-financing requirement on foreign direct investment was abolished
in January 1997.
(ix) Foreign banks, investment trust companies and stockbrokerage firms were
allowed to set up local subsidiaries from March 31st, 1998.
It should be noted that most elements of the post-OECD program were implemented
ahead of schedule because extensive financial reforms were an integral part of the
structural adjustment program that the Korean government had negotiated with the
IMF in response to the financial crisis.
3. Effects of Financial Reforms on Corporate Financing and the Current Account
3.1 Financial Liberalization and Corporate Financing
   The deregulation of interest rates, the lowering of entry barriers, the introduction of
new financial instruments and other financial liberalization measures have led to a
sharp expansion in the accumulation of financial assets since the 1980s. The financial
interrelation ration (FIR), or the ratio of total domestic financial assets to GNP, has
shown a sustained increase from 3.09 in 1980 to 5.55 in 1996. Positive real interest
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rates, new financial instruments, a more extensive network of financial services and
the development of the securities market have all contributed to this remarkable
financial development.
   An increase in financial assets, however, does not necessarily lead to economic
growth [see Levine (1997), Arestis and Demetriades (1997)]. The main channel of
transmission from financial development to growth is through the efficiency rather
than the volume of investment. Prudential regulation is essential in enhancing the
efficiency of investment. Therefore, a poor regulatory environment, as in Latin
America [see Gregorio and Guidotti (1992)], may result in a negative correlation
between financial intermediation and growth.
   In the case of Korea, rapid financial development has been accompanied by an
increase in investment and vigorous economic growth largely because financial
development has contributed to corporate financing. Direct financing in corporate
fund-raising, in particular, has risen sharply. The share of direct financing – stocks,
bonds and commercial paper - in total corporate external financing rose from 22.9 %
in 1980 to 47% in 1996. This was due to the following factors. First, an increase in the
demand for securities by institutional investors induced companies to make greater
use of equity financing. Second, firms expanded their issuance of corporate bonds in
order to secure medium and long-term investment funds. Third, the commercial paper
market has become quite mature.
   On the other hand, the share of indirect financing in total corporate external
financing declined from 36% in 1980 to 31.3% in 1996. Most strikingly, the share of
borrowing from banks fell from 20.8% to 15.7% during the same period. Meanwhile,
the share of borrowing from non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) ro e substantially
from 15.2% in 1980 to 23.8% in 1994. The increasing importance of NBFIs was due
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largely to an asymmetric regulatory fr mework which favored them over banks.
NBFIs were allowed greater freedom in asset and liability management, as well as in
setting interest rates on deposits and loans. However, the share of NBFIs began to fall
from 1985 due to greater deregulation of the banking sector.
   In spite of the overall increase in the share of direct financing, debt financing
through issuance of commercial paper and corporate bonds has grown much more
rapidly than equity financing. As a result, the ratio of debt financing to total external
financing remained at an extremely high level of 89% in 1996. Such an abnormally
high debt-to-equity ratio implies that Korea’s corporate sector is quite vulnerable to a
change in the business environment. Therefore, further development of the stock
market and a correspondingly greater role of equity financing are desirable.
   Although financial liberalization has led to significantly greater availability of
financing, it has not been sufficient to meet the increasing demand for corporate
financing since corporate investment has expanded even more. In particular, the
supply of long-term funds has been consistently insufficient and consequently, the
share of short-term financing in total external financing has risen sharply. An increase
in short-term interest rates due to interest rate deregulation has also contributed to the
growing share of short-term financing. Companies that depend heavily on short-term
financing are less likely to take a long-term perspective in making investment
decisions and, more importantly, are likely to face greater risks from sudden changes
in the financial environment. Accordingly, the development of long-term financial
markets will benefit Korea by increasing the supply of long-term funds.
3.2 Capital Market Opening and the Current Account
   Due to the opening of its financial markets, Korea’s capital account balance
experienced a sharp turnaround between 1987 and 1996, from – 4.3% to 3.6% of
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GDP. In the early 1980s, the capital account was in surplus but this was mostly due to
public sector borrowing, which declined from the mid–1980s. Outward foreign direct
investment (FDI) began to outstrip inward FDI after 1990. As a result, the ratio of net
FDI to GDP fell from 0.4% in 1988 to – 0.4% in 1996. In contrast, inward portfolio
investment rose sharply in the 1990s due to the stock market opening. The ratio of net
portfolio investment to GDP rose from 0.3% in 1990 to 2.3% in 1996. Thus, Korea’s
capital account surplus in the 1990s was mostly attributable to the upsurge in inward
portfolio investment.
   Capital inflows may contribute to a rise in productive investment and, as a result, an
improvement of the current account but more likely, they help worsen the current
account balance through currency appreciation. The extent to which capital inflows
will produce an appreciation of the currency depends on: (i) themacroeconomic
environment and (ii) the nature of the inflows – i.e. whether they are largely FDI or
portfolio investment. Furthermore, the higher the proportion of inflows channeled into
consumption rather than investment, the greater will be their negative effect on the
current account balance. In particular, there is generally a close relationship between
short-term capital inflows, including portfolio investment, and the current account.
   As Oh (1997) notes, there are three main channels by which movements in the
capital account induce movements in the current account. First, as noted above, short-
term capital inflows produce appreciation of the domestic currency or, equivalently,
fall in the real exchange rate. This makes domestic goods and services more
expensive relative to foreign goods and services and so worsens the current account.
Second, capital inflows may influence private consumption through two channels: an
increase in domestic credit and rise in asset prices. The increase in domestic credit
leads to greater availability of consumer credit while the appreciation of asset prices
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creates a wealth effect. Choi and Song (1996) examine the rise in Korean asset prices
due to Korea’s financial market opening. An increase in consumption, of course,
worsens the current account. Finally, higher investment due to capital inflows has
ambiguous effects on the current account. On one hand, the increase in productive
capacity may entail more exports and improve the current account. On the other hand,
remittance of investment income and imports of intermediate goods will worsen it.
   According to recent empirical studies by Oh (1997b, 1998), the evidence indicates
that capital inflows have had the negative expected effect on the current account
balance in Korea through significant effects on the real exchange rate and
consumption. According to Oh, short-term inflows have had a particularly strong
impact. He also finds that although capital flows encourage investment, investment
does not influence the current account. Korea’s current account balance had improved
steadily during most of the 1980s but began to steadily deteriorate from 1989 and
moved into progressively larger deficits. The ratio of the current account balance to
GDP peaked at 7.8% but declined to – 4.9% in 1996. The significant negative effect
of capital inflows on the current account balance suggests that policymakers should
pay greater attention to exchange rate management and prudential supervision of the
financial sector in liberalizing and opening up the financial sector.
3. Financial Crisis and Management Issues
3.1 Recent Financial Market Instability and Policy Responses
   Until the financial crisis broke out in late 1997, the Korean economy had been
fundamentally sound and was recovering from a cyclical downturn. Macroeconomic
indicators were also improving – GDP growth of over 6%, inflation of 4.5% and a
current account deficit of about 3% of GDP were recorded in 1997. Fiscal policy had
remained prudent, with the budget for 1997 recording a modest deficit. The monetary
16
aggregate had edged down to the bottom of its range for the inflation target.
   However, warning signals were flashing in the markets. Since the beginning of
1997, an unprecedented number of highly leveraged cha bols have become insolvent.
The high incidence of bankruptcies reflects a number of factors, including excessive
investment in certain sectors, weaker prices for exports and political instability. The
bankruptcies spilled over into a sharp increase in non-performing loans. The amount
of non-performing loans rose sharply. Market sentiment was becoming increasingly
uncertain and unstable, and banks were turning extremely reluctant to lend. A severe
credit crunch was taking place.
   The present difficulties of the financial sector stem from the lack of market
orientation in financial institutions combined with lax prudential supervision.
Financial institutions had priced risks poorly and proved too willing to finance the
unrealistically ambitious investment plans of the corporate sector, which led to
excessive leveraging and massive over-capacity in the real sector. At the same time, a
steep decline in stock prices had cut the value of banks’ equity and further reduced
their net worth. These events led to successive downgrading of Korean financial
institutions by international credit rating agencies and a sharp contraction in the
availability of external financing.
   Consequently, the Korean government introduced comprehensive preventive
measures to stabilize market sentiment so as to minimize economic costs and facilitate
the ongoing financial reform efforts. On August 25th, 1997, the government
announced a comprehensive package to stabilize the domestic financial markets and
enhance financial institutions’ creditworthiness in the international financial markets.
The package was aimed at eliminating the recent growing concern in both the
domestic and international financial markets.
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   The package included emergency support for the troubled Korea First Bank, a large
nationwide commercial bank, as well as some merchant banking corporations,
including special loans. The government also helped Korea First Bank improve its
capital adequacy by acquiring its stocks in exchange for government bonds. Merchant
banking corporations were granted access to the Bank of Korea’s short-term RP
facilities in the hope that this would improve their short-term financing channels.
Furthermore, the government established a Non–Performing Asset Management Fund
in November 1997 to facilitate the disposal of non-performing loans and exempted
financial institutions from the capital gains tax on the sale of collateralized real estate.
   Above all, the government took every measure to assure the international
community that Korean financial institutions would repay all their debts to foreign
creditors. The government used its credit standing to ensure the payment of the
foreign debt liabilities of Korean financial institutions. Of course, institutions
benefiting from this arrangement were required to submit and implement restructuring
plans. Prudential supervisory measures were also reinforced. The risk–adjusted capital
standards recommended by the BIS were introduced and banks were advised to set
aside sufficient provisions for expected losses from bad loans. Mandatory disclosure
of banks’ performance and the standing surveillance system were reinforced for
improved monitoring of the banks.
   Nevertheless, Korea’s external financing situation continued to deteriorate sharply
after October 23rd, 1997, following a plunge in the Hong Kong stock market and the
downgrading of Korea’s sovereign risk by Standard and Poor. New external financing
virtually dried up and severe difficulties were encountered in rolling over the
relatively large amount of short-term debts. The won depreciated sharply against the
U.S. dollar while the stock index fell to a ten-year low. Official foreign exchange
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reserves also collapsed, as large amounts were allocated to finance the repayment of
the short-term foreign debts of commercial banks.
   While the contagion effects of the events in Southeast Asia undoubtedly contributed
to the current crisis, the speed and magnitude of the financial deterioration was largely
due to the structural weaknesses of Korea’s financial and corporate sectors. In
particular, the problems of merchant banks lay at the heart of the turmoil. In Korea,
thirty merchant banks specialized in short-term financing, selling such products as
commercial paper, discounting corporate bills, and operating cash management
accounts (CMAs). Many of them suffered big losses in the wake of the chain of
corporate bankruptcies. Their problems spilled over directly to commercial banks
which had made call loans to merchant banks. Accordingly, in early December, the
government closed nine merchant banks.
3.2 IMF Bailout Funds and Policy Tasks
   In spite of the preventive measures, the financial turmoil, in particular the
speculative attacks on the Korean won, did not die down. Finally, on November 21st,
1997, the Korean government asked the IMF for a bailout. It signed an agreement on
a US$55 billion rescue package with the IMF on December 3rd, 1997, after intense
negotiations over ten days. Of the US$55 billion, the IMF, World Bank and Asian
Development Bank (ADB) are to contribute US$21 billion, US$10 billion and US$4
billion respectively.
   The Memorandum on the Economic Program signed between the Korean
government and the IMF covers three important areas – mac oeconomic policies,
financial restructuring and other structural measures. First of all, sound
macroeconomic policies include a tighter monetary policy and substantial fiscal belt-
tightening. These are required for orderly re-adjustment of the current account and to
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contain inflationary pressures. The program involves a GDP contraction of about 3%
in 1998 followed by modest positive growth in 1999, inflation of 5% or less, and
building up foreign exchange reserves to more than two months’ cover for imports by
1998.
   The centerpiece of the program is a comprehensive restructuring and reform plan
for the financial sector. It includes a detailed strategy to restructure and re-capitalize
the financial sector and make it more transparent, market-oriented, better supervised
and free of political interference. Prudential standards are to be upgraded, timetables
will be established for all banks to meet the Basle standards of capital adequacy, the
disposal of non-performing loans is to be accelerated, and accounting standards and
disclosure rules are to be strengthened to meet international practice.
   Other structural measures are aimed at, among other things, improving corporate
governance, accelerating the liberalization of capital account transactions, further
liberalizing foreign trade, and improving the transparency and timeliness of economic
data. In particular, improving corporate governance by forcing the corporate sector to
become more transparent is expected to contribute to a healthier financial system. In
addition, the government will take measures to make the labor markets more flexible.
   In spite of the arrival of funds from the IMF and the adoption of various
stabilization measures by the government, the turmoil in the foreign exchange markets
showed no signs of abating until late 1997. The won fell to a record low of 1965 to a
dollar on December 23rd. Meanwhile, the stock market continued to stumble while
interest rates remained high.
   In response to the continuing crisis, the Bank of Korea provided liquidity of 11.3
trillion won to financial institutions from December 15. The government also
accelerated the implementation of the IMF program, with many measures being
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implemented well ahead of schedule. At the same time, the IMF agreed to release
some of the bailout funds earlier than the original schedule.
   A positive development was the reversal of the chronic current account deficit into a
surplus of US$545 million by November 1997. The surplus grew further to US$3.6
billion in December, and US$3.2 billion in January 1998.  More importantly, in
January 28th, 1998, the government negotiated the rescheduling of short-term debts
owed by Korean financial institutions. Those debts were rolled over for a period of
one to three years. Foreign portfolio investments seem to be gradually returning to the
Korean market, with the net inflows during the first two months of 1998 totaling
around US$3 billion. At a more general level, the financial markets are at last
beginning to show signs of normalization since March – as evidenced by the
relatively stable exchange rate, declining interest rates, recovering stock market and
rising international reserves.
   In retrospect, the recent crisis has arisen from a massive shift of funds out of
domestic financial markets. From the beginning of 1990 to October 1997, net
portfolio investments in the Korean capital market amounted to US$62 billion. Of
these, US$25 billion flowed in between 1996 and October 1997. Their sudden outflow
in November 1997 triggered the financial crisis, leading to a sharp depreciation of the
Korean won, the collapse of the stock market index to a 10–year low, and a sharp fall
in international reserves. Market sentiment plays a central role whenever there is a
sudden shift of funds. Restoring market confidence is thus critical to containing the
current crisis and preventing further weakening of the financial system. In this
connection, to send clear and credible signals to the market, insolvent financial
institutions need to be closed so as to facilitate the restructuring and recapitaliz tion
of their weak but viable competitors.
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   Some important lessons emerge from the Korean financial crisis. First, as obvious
as this may seem, financial i termediation does not simply mean a transfer of funds
from lenders to borrowers but efficient allocation of funds to the most efficient
investment projects. Efficiency must be the principal criterion by which the Korean
financial system evaluates itself in the future. The information production function of
financial institutions plays a central role in achieving efficiency.
   However, Korean financial institutions have so far failed to perform this central
function effectively. Due to heavy-handed government intervention and absence of
managerial autonomy, there has been little incentive for financial institutions to
undertake serious credit evaluation or ex-post monitoring. As a result, much of the
capital inflows went into unproductive projects, which, in turn, have created a
massive hangover of bad loans. Krugman (1998) points out that financial
intermediaries whose liabilities are guaranteed by the government pose a serious
moral hazard problem and distort the allocation of capital.
   It is possible for us to argue that an imbalance between domestic financial reforms
and external financial liberalization was one of the underlying causes of Korea’s
financial crisis. Until domestic reforms have rendered the domestic financial system
efficient and internationally competitive, it may be premature to open up the financial
sector to foreign players since an inefficient system cannot efficiently allocate the
inflows of foreign capital to their most productive uses [see Park (1997)]. Yet in the
case of Korea, it appears that external liberalization was accelerated even though
internal reforms remained quite incomplete. The latter have to be completed as soon
as possible in order for Korea to enjoy the full benefits of internationalization. For
example, the ownership structure and managerial autonomy of the financial
institutions have to be strengthened so that they will have sufficient incentive to
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undertake serious ex-ante and ex-post monitoring of corporate borrowers.
   Second, the Korean economy urgently needs a sound financial system free of
political interference and in line with the rules and practices of the advanced
industrialized economies if it is to overcome its current crisis and return to a path of
sustainable economic growth toward its potential productive capacity. Viable
financial institutions need to be restructured and recapitalized while insolvent ones
should be shut down. A set of comprehensive reforms, including those facilitating M
& As, is required in order to strengthen the competitiveness of financial institutions.
   Third, prudential supervision to maintain the systemic health of the financial sector
has to be reinforced in line with the progress of financial reforms. More deregulated
and competitive markets may increase the likelihood of certain types of risk, thus
creating new threats to the stability of the financial system as a whole. It is therefore
important for the Bank of Korea to encourage financial institutions to reinforce their
risk management systems and capital adequacy.
   Fourth, although financial liberalization and internationalization entail many
benefits, they also give rise to undesirable side effects. As a result, it is imperative for
the authorities to maintain m croeconomic stability. Monetary policy, exchange rate
policy and fiscal policy should all be geared toward this end [see Haggard and Lee
(1995)]. The pursuit of financial liberalization and internationalization in an unstable
macroeconomic environment will not only accentuate an economy’s existing sources
of instability but also create new ones [see Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993)].
5. Conclusions and Perspectives
   There are a growing number of studies that analyze the causes of the Asian financial
crisis. For instance, IMF (1997) points out some key factors responsible for the
present difficulties of Asian economies: first, the failure to dampen overheating,
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manifested in large current account deficits and bubbles in the stock markets as well
as the property markets; second, rigid adherence to pegged exchange rate regimes that
encouraged external borrowing; third, lax prudential standards and financial oversight
that contributed to a sharp deterioration in the quality of bank loan portfolios; fourth,
political uncertainties and doubts about the authorities’ commitment and ability to
implement necessary adjustments and reforms; and fifth, developments in the
advanced industrial economies and global financial markets, specifically weak growth
in Japan and Europe which drove large flows of capital to emerging markets.
   As a whole, all the elements of the IMF analysis are relevant to the Korean crisis,
except for the pegged exchange rate regime. Korea operated a kind of managed
floating exchange rate regime until December 15th, 1997, when there was a shift to a
free floating regime. However, in view of the chronic current account deficit, it is
possible to argue that the exchange rates have been misalign d since the late 1980s.
   But, as suggested earlier, what appears to have been the principal factor in the
Korean crisis is the unbalanced nature of financial reforms. That is, external financial
liberalization was carried out far faster than domestic financial liberalization even
though the latter is a pre-condition for the former. In this connection, we should note
that the government may have accelerated external liberalization in order to join the
OECD. As a result, the domestic financial system could not efficiently allocate the
large amount of foreign capital that began to flow in. In particular, the Korean
financial institutions had only limited information production capability – competence
in screening ex–ante screening and ex–post monitoring of borrowers. Nor did they
face strong incentives to develop such a capability due to insufficient ownership
interests and managerial autonomy. Prudential supervision to maintain the systemic
safety of the financial industry also left a lot to be desired. As a result, a lot of the
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foreign capital inflows were invested in risky, unproductive projects, which were
likely to turn into non-performing loans.
   Accordingly, the key to overcoming the current financial crisis is the transformation
of the weak financial system into a sound one. The success of this endeavor depends
to a large extent on the decisiveness with which the authorities facilitate the closure of
insolvent financial institutions as well as the restructuring and recapitalization of
weak but viable institutions so as to restore confidence in the financial system. The
authorities should take measures to help foster the information production capability
of financial institutions. In this connection, they need to strengthen ownership
structures and managerial autonomy. Furthermore, prudential regulation and
supervision need to be reinforced. Finally, a re–definition of the relationship between
the banking sector and the corporate sector will help the latter, which is highly
leveraged, restructure itself.
   None of these tasks are likely to be easy or straightforward. However, if there is a
genuine commitment to the reform process and a clear understanding that financial
reforms are an integral part of a necessary structural adjustment process, the current
challenges present an excellent opportunity for Korea to improve its own
fundamentals. In this light, we can view the financial cr sis as a blessing in disguise
insofar as it serves as a catalyst for long overdue reforms which, if successfully
implemented, will improve the long-term competitiveness of the Korean economy.
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